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interest-rate feedback rules are implemented in a continuous-time optimizing model
of a small open economy facing an imperfect global capital market. It is demon-
strated that when a risk premium on external debt affects the monetary policy
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minacy of equilibrium. On the other hand, it is shown that exchange rate dynamics
critically depends on whether monetary policy is active or passive.
JEL Classification: F31, F32, E52.
Keywords: Risk Premium on Foreign Debt; Taylor Rules; Exchange Rate Dy-
namics.
∗We wish to thank Fabrizio Adriani, Mikael Bask, Andrea Costa, Giuseppe De Arcangelis, Ester
Faia, Laurence Harris, Giancarlo Marini, Giovanni Piersanti, Giorgio Rodano, Pasquale Scaramozzino,
seminar participants at CeFiMS - University of London, DTE - University of Rome “La Sapienza”, and
participants at the II RIEF Conference on International Economics and Finance - University of Rome
“Tor Vergata” for very helpful comments and suggestions.
†Corresponding Author : Department of Economics, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Via Columbia
2, 00133 Roma, Italy. E-mail: barbara.annicchiarico@uniroma2.it. Phone: +390672595731. Fax:
+39062020500.
‡Department of Economics, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma, Italy.
E-mail: alessandro.piergallini@uniroma2.it.
1 Introduction
Modern research on monetary policy provides strong theoretical foundations for the use
of simple interest-rate feedback rules, that specify the setting of the nominal interest
rate as a function of endogenous variables, such as inflation and output. The standard
literature emphasizes the stabilizing role of ‘active’ interest rate rules, that respond to
increases in inflation with a more than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest rate
(e.g., Taylor, 1999; King, 2000; Gal´ı, 2003; Woodford 2003; McCallum, 2003). These
policy rules a` la Taylor (1993) have originally been designed for developed economies. An
important related issue that has attracted growing attention in the recent policy debate
is the design of monetary policy in emerging market and developing economies. The
occurrence of exchange rate crises in emerging economies during the 1990s has warned
against the adoption of ‘soft’ peg exchange rate regimes, as pointed out by Fischer (2001).
In particular, Taylor (2001) argues that ‘for those emerging market economies that do not
choose a policy of a ‘permanently’ fixed exchange rate (perhaps through a currency board
or a common currency (dollarization)), then the only sound monetary policy is one based
on the trinity of a flexible exchange rate, an inflation target, and a monetary policy rule’.
This paper presents an investigation of the dynamic effects of interest-rate feedback
policies of Taylor’s style within a small open economy facing an imperfect world capital
market. Specifically, the analysis is derived in a continuous-time optimizing general equi-
librium framework with flexible exchange rates and an upward-sloping supply curve of
foreign debt. Our focus on the implications of financial externalities, associated with the
upward-sloping supply schedule of external debt, is motivated by the fact that emerging
market and developing countries are subject to credit risk, which constrains their bor-
rowing opportunities. The existence of a risk premium on foreign indebtness in emerging
market and developing economies constitutes a fairly well-established stylized fact (e.g.,
Age´nor and Montiel, 1999; Montiel 2003).
The model considered in this paper is used to examine two relevant issues in monetary
1
theory. First, we investigate dynamic stability to evaluate whether uniqueness of equi-
librium requires that the central bank reacts to inflation with a more than proportional
increase in the nominal interest rate (the so-called ‘Taylor principle’), as predicted by the
standard theory on Taylor rules (e.g., Woodford 2003). Second, we reconsider the issue
of exchange rate dynamics in response to exogenous changes in the domestic nominal
interest rate, government spending, the level of productivity, the subjective discount rate,
the foreign nominal interest rate, and the foreign inflation rate.
We demonstrate that when a risk premium on external debt affects the monetary
policy transmission mechanism, the Taylor principle is not a necessary condition for de-
terminacy of equilibrium. That is, ‘passive’ interest rate policies, that underreact to
inflation by increasing the nominal interest rate by less than a raise in domestic inflation,
are compatible with saddle-path stability. The economic intuition for this result can be
explained as follows.
Consider first a standard closed-economy framework, with either flexible or sticky
prices. In such a setup, the destabilizing effect of passive monetary policies has the fol-
lowing rationale. If consumers expect a high level of inflation and monetary policy is
passive, the real interest rate declines. As a result of the Euler equation, characterizing
the consumption-saving optimal decision, households reduce savings and increase con-
sumption. The associated increase in aggregate demand causes prices to increase, hence
validating the initial inflation expectations. As a consequence, passive monetary policies
generate indeterminacy of equilibrium. Monetary policies in the respect of the Taylor
principle are necessary to induce a unique stable equilibrium.
Consider now what occurs in a small-open-economy framework in which the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy is crucially affected by a risk premium on external
debt. When monetary policy is passive, an upward perturbation in inflation causes the
real interest rate to decrease and private consumption to increase, analogously to the
closed-economy case. However, the increase in consumption tends to stimulate foreign
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debt accumulation over time, hence leading to an increase in the country-specific risk
premium. This makes the interest rate on foreign debt rise. Ceteris paribus, international
parity conditions precluding arbitrage opportunities require an increase in the domestic
real interest rate, which reduces aggregate demand and inflation. As a result, active
monetary policies are not necessary to guarantee macroeconomic stability.
Despite the fact that saddle-path stability does not require an aggressive interest rate
policy, the study of transitional dynamics we perform demonstrates that exchange rate
adjustment in response to exogenous disturbances depends in a critical way on whether
monetary policy is active or passive. In this respect, as we shall see, our analysis also
yields additional insights into the question of exchange rate determination.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes
the monetary policy regimes. Section 3 derives the perfect-foresight macroeconomic equi-
librium. Section 4 develops the steady-state analysis. Section 5 studies the stability
properties of the setup and examines the issue of transitional dynamics. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy operating in a world of ongoing inflation and flexible
exchange rates. The economy is described by a one-good-monetary model and consists of
four types of agents: consumers, firms, the government and the central bank. All agents
have perfect foresight.
The domestic economy produces and consumes only one tradeable and non-storable
good. Purchasing power parity (PPP) is assumed to hold at all times:
P = P ∗E, (1)
where P (P ∗) is the domestic (foreign) price and E is the nominal exchange rate, defined
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as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. In percentage terms the PPP
is given by:
π = π∗ + e, (2)
where π (π∗) is the inflation rate of the good in terms of domestic (foreign) currency and
e is the rate of exchange depreciation of domestic currency.
Domestic residents may hold two assets: domestic money, which is not held by for-
eigners, and internationally-traded traded bonds. International capital mobility implies
that interest parity of the following type holds:
R = R∗ + e, (3)
where R∗ and R denote the foreign and the domestic nominal rate, respectively.
2.1 The Private Sector
The infinitely-lived representative consumer faces the following lifetime utility function:
∞∫
0
[U(c, ℓ) + V (m)]e−βtdt, (4)
where β is the rate of time preference and c, ℓ and m denote consumption, labor and real
money balances, respectively. Functions U(·) and V (·) satisfy the following conditions:
Uc > 0, Uℓ < 0, V
′ > 0, Ucc < 0, Uℓℓ < 0, Ucℓ < 0, and V
′′ < 0.
The flow budget constraint in real terms is:
•
m+
•
a = wℓ+ z − τ − c+ (R∗ − π∗)a− πm, (5)
where a denotes world-traded bonds, w the wage rate, z profits, and τ lump-sum taxes.
Throughout the paper, for any generic variable of the model x,
•
x denotes dx/dt.
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The representative agent chooses the optimal plan for c, ℓ, m and a in order to maxi-
mize her lifetime utility (4), subject to (5) and given the initial conditions:
m(0) =
M0
P (0)
, a(0) =
E0A0
P0
=
A0
P ∗0
, (6)
where M and A denote the nominal stocks of money and of traded assets, respectively.
The solution to the consumer’s optimization problem yields the following conditions:
Uc(c, ℓ)− µ = 0, (7)
Uℓ(c, ℓ) + wµ = 0, (8)
V ′(m)− µπ = −
•
µ+ µβ, (9)
µ(R∗ − π∗) = −
•
µ+ µβ, (10)
together with the flow budget constraint (5), the initial conditions (6), and the transver-
sality conditions:
lim
t→∞
µme−βt = lim
t→∞
µae−βt = 0, (11)
where µe−βt is the discounted Lagrange multiplier associated with the wealth accumula-
tion equation (5).
Perfectly competitive firms face the following production function:
y = Λφ(ℓ), (12)
where y and ℓ denote output and the labor input, respectively, φ′(·) > 0, φ′′(·) < 0, and
Λ is a positive technology parameter. Each firm hires labor in order to maximize profits.
At the optimum, labor marginal productivity is equal to the real wage rate:
Λφ′(ℓ) = w. (13)
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Perfect competition ensures that profits are zero in equilibrium, so that y = wℓ.
2.2 The Public Sector
The public sector is composed by the government and the central bank. The domestic
government faces the following flow budget constraint expressed in real terms:
•
m+
•
b = g − τ + (R− π)b− πm, (14)
where g is public spending and b denotes the real stock of of traded bonds issued by
the government. Lump-sum taxes are set in order to rule any explosive behavior of the
government liabilities.
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of the inflation
rate in the spirit of Taylor (1993, 1999):
R = i+ ρ(π), (15)
where ρ(·) is continuous, non-decreasing, and there exists at least one π > −β such that
i + ρ(π) = β + π; i is a positive parameter capturing exogenous deviations from the
feedback component of the rule. Following Leeper (1991), the interest rate rule (15) is
‘active (‘passive’) if ρ′ > (<)1. In other words, under an active (passive) monetary policy,
the central bank responds to inflation by raising (lowering) the real interest rate and the
so-called Taylor’s principle is (is not) satisfied.
2.3 Current Account Dynamics and the Risk Premium
Subtracting (14) from (5) one can obtain the budget constraint which describes the rate
of change of net credit of the domestic economy which in turn equals the balance of
payments on current accounts:
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•n = y − c− g + (R∗ − π∗)n, (16)
where n denotes the net stock of traded bonds defined as n = a− b.
Henceforth, we shall assume that n < 0, in which case the home country is a net debtor.
For convenience, we can thus rewrite (16) in terms of net foreign debt accumulation as:
•
f = c+ g − y + (R∗ − π∗)f. (17)
where, by definition, f = −n.
Following Bardhan (1967), Obstfeld (1982), Bhandari, Haque and Turnovsky (1990),
and Turnovsky (1997), we assume that the home country has not access to a perfect
world capital market, but faces an upward-sloping supply curve of foreign debt. From the
standpoint of the borrowing economy, the nominal interest rate on foreign debt R∗ can
then be expressed as follows:
R∗ = i∗ + σ(f), (18)
where i∗ is the interest rate prevailing in the world market and σ(f) is the country-specific
risk premium. The function σ(·) is assumed to be continuous, increasing in f and strictly
positive.
3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Combining the set of optimality conditions (7)-(10) and (13) together with the interest
rate on foreign debt function (18), the international parity conditions (2) and (3), the
production function (12), the monetary policy rule (15), and the foreign debt accumulation
equation (17), the perfect-foresight equilibrium can be described as follows:
•
µ = µβ − (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)µ, (19)
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•f = c+ g − Λφ(ℓ) + (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)f, (20)
c = c(µ,Λ), cµ, cΛ < 0, (21)
ℓ = ℓ(µ,Λ), ℓµ, ℓΛ > 0, (22)
y = Λφ(ℓ), (23)
m = m(µ) +
1
ρ′ − 1
η (i∗, f, i, π∗) , mµ < 0, ηi∗ , ηf < 0, ηi, ηπ∗ > 0, (24)
e =
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫ (i∗, f, i, π∗) , ǫi∗ , ǫf > 0, ǫi, ǫπ∗ < 0, (25)
where (19) and (20) are the pair of equations describing the evolution of the economy
over time and (21)-(25) describe the equilibrium paths for consumption, work effort, pro-
duction, real money balances and the rate of exchange depreciation of domestic currency,
respectively. See Appendix A for details.
4 Steady-State Analysis
Under perfect foresight, the transitional dynamics of the model depends in part on the ex-
pectations of the long-run steady state. This Section derives the steady-state equilibrium
and the long-run effects of changes in both domestic and foreign exogenous variables.
The steady state of the economy is obtained when the shadow value of wealth is
constant and external debt accumulation ceases, that is when
•
µ =
•
f = 0. From (19)-(25),
the steady state consists of the following set of relationships:
β = i∗ + σ(f)− π∗, (26)
Λφ(ℓ(µ,Λ)) = (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)f + c(µ,Λ) + g, (27)
c = c(µ,Λ), (28)
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ℓ = ℓ(µ,Λ), (29)
y = Λφ(ℓ), (30)
m = m(µ) +
1
ρ′ − 1
η
(
i∗, f , i, π∗
)
, (31)
e =
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫ(i∗, f , i, π∗). (32)
Equations (26)-(32) jointly determine the steady-state equilibrium solutions for µ, f , c,
ℓ, y, m and e as functions of the rate of time preference β, the technology parameter Λ,
public spending g, the monetary policy rule exogenous component i, foreign inflation π∗,
and the interest rate prevailing in the world market i∗.
To study exchange rate dynamics, it is convenient to write down the long-run re-
sponses to changes in exogenous variables of foreign debt and of the rate of depreciation,
respectively. The responses to changes in domestic variables are given by:
df
di
= 0,
df
dβ
=
1
σ′
> 0,
df
dΛ
=
df
dg
= 0, (33)
de
di
= −
1
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0,
de
dβ
=
1
ρ′ − 1
> (<)1 if ρ > (<)1 and
de
dΛ
=
de
dg
= 0. (34)
On the other hand, the responses to changes in the foreign variables are given by:
df
dπ∗
=
1
σ′
> 0,
df
di∗
= −
1
σ′
< 0, (35)
de
dπ∗
= −1,
de
di∗
= 0. (36)
The long-run responses of all endogenous variables of the economy to changes in the
exogenous variables of both domestic and foreign origin are reported in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively, where ∆ ≡ −σ′ (cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)) > 0. Full derivations are developed
in Appendix B.
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5 Transitional Dynamics
Linearizing the differential equations (19)-(20) around the steady-state equilibrium
{
µ, f
}
yields: 

•
f
•
µ

 =

 β + σ
′f cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
−σ′µ 0



 f − f
µ− µ

 . (37)
The above system displays one predetermined variable, f , and one jumping variable, µ.
In order to have a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in the neighborhood of the steady
state (i.e., saddle-path stability), the Jacobian of the system must have eigenvalues of
opposite sign. This property is satisfied by the system (37), since the determinant of the
Jacobian, given by σ′µ [cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)], is negative. The Taylor principle, ρ
′ > 1,
is not necessary to bring about equilibrium determinacy. Intuitively, this is because the
time path of inflation depends not only on the central bank’s behavior, but also on the
time path of external debt and the international parity conditions. Whether monetary
policy is active or passive is immaterial for determinacy.
Focusing now on the stable path, the solutions for f and e are given by:
f = f +
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (38)
e = e+
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫf
(
f − f
)
, (39)
where λ < 0 is the stable eigenvalue and f0 is the initial condition on foreign debt (see
Appendix C for full derivations). Using the steady-state multipliers given by (33)-(36),
the impact effects on the rate of depreciation of changes in domestic and foreign variables
are, respectively:
de (0)+
di
= −
1
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0 if ρ > (<)1,
de (0)+
dβ
=
de (0)+
dΛ
=
de (0)+
dg
= 0, (40)
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de (0)+
dπ∗
= −
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0,
de (0)+
di∗
=
1
ρ′ − 1
> (<)0 if ρ > (<)1. (41)
The impact effects on all endogenous variables of changes in domestic and foreign variables
are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 (see Appendix D for details).
From the analysis of both the steady-state equilibrium and the transitional dynamics,
it emerges that the dynamic behavior of the nominal exchange rate critically depends
upon whether the monetary policy reaction coefficient ρ′ is above or below unity. Exam-
ining (39), in fact, the exchange depreciation rate is correlated with foreign debt along
the transitional path towards the steady-state equilibrium, with a coefficient, ǫf/ (ρ
′ − 1),
which is greater (lower) than zero if ρ′ > (<) 1. An intuitive explanation is the following.
A change in external indebtedness alters the international parity conditions given by the
risk-adjusted interest rate parity, thereby influencing exchange rate dynamics. In partic-
ular, an increase in foreign debt makes the country-specific risk premium rise, leading to
an increase in the nominal interest rate faced by the small open economy. This brings
about an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate net of domestic currency depre-
ciation, according to the risk-adjusted interest rate parity condition. Recalling the PPP
condition, it also follows that the domestic real interest rate has to raise. The key point
is that when monetary policy is active (passive), an increase in the domestic real interest
rate may occur if and only if there is an increase (decrease) in the exchange depreciation
rate. Exchange rate dynamics are thus qualitatively affected by whether the interest rate
rule is active or passive. This is illustrated in Figures 1-2.
Specifically, Figures 1 and 2 plot the time path of the nominal exchange depreciation
rate in response to changes in i, β, π∗ and i∗ under active and passive monetary policy,
respectively.
Figure 1a shows that the rate of exchange depreciation instantaneously declines in
response to an increase in i. In this case there is no transitional dynamics, since in the
steady state a change in the nominal interest rate does not affect foreign indebtedness. The
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exchange rate jumps instantaneously to the new steady state. Intuitively, an exogenous
rise in i must crowd out the endogenous component of the domestic real interest rate
(ρ(π) − π), in order to restore both the risk-adjusted interest rate parity and the PPP.
Since monetary policy overreacts to inflation, the endogenous component of the domestic
real interest rate decreases only when the rate of exchange depreciation decreases.
On the other hand, an increase in the rate of time preference β increases the level
of indebtedness and hence the cost of external borrowing. In this case, the combination
of the active Taylor rule with the risk-corrected interest parity and the PPP implies an
increase in the depreciation rate of the domestic currency. The exchange rate, in fact,
starts to increase converging gradually to its long-run equilibrium (see Figure 1b).
An increase in foreign inflation π∗ causes external indebtness to raise and the rate
of exchange depreciation to fall in the long run, as it emerges from equations (35) and
(36). Under an active monetary policy, a rise in foreign inflation implies a reduction on
impact of the domestic currency depreciation rate, which overshoots its long-run value
(see Figure 1c). After the initial downward jump, in fact, e starts to increase, approaching
asymptotically a new steady-state below its original level.
Figure 1d shows that an increase in the world interest rate i∗ determines an upward
jump of the rate of exchange depreciation on impact, since foreign bonds become more
attractive. This implies a decline in the steady-state foreign debt, as it emerges from
(35). As long as the monetary authorities are engaged in an active interest rate policy,
the reduction in the level of external debt over time must be associated with a decline in
e, along the adjustment path towards the new steady-state equilibrium. This can occur
if only if there is an instantaneous upward jump in e.
From Figures 2a-2d, one can see how the responses of the nominal exchange rate
obtained under an interest rate rule satisfying the Taylor principle are reversed in the
case of an accommodating monetary policy, underreacting to inflation. A passive Taylor
rule requires a decline in the exchange depreciation rate each time that a domestic real
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interest rate increase is necessary to restore the equilibrium due, for example, to increases
in β or i∗ (see Figures 2b and 2d). On the other hand, an increase in i requires a reduction
in the endogenous component of the domestic real rate implying, under a passive rule, a
higher depreciation rate (see Figure 2a). An increase in foreign inflation requires a long-
run fall in the rate of exchange depreciation, although it brings about an upward jump of
e on impact (see Figure 2c). In this case, only the short-run response crucially depends
on the monetary policy regime, while the effects of the PPP prevail in the long run.
6 Conclusions
External indebtedness poses constraints on the borrowing opportunities of emerging mar-
ket and developing economies, as empirically evidenced. We have analyzed the dynamic
effects of interest rate rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993, 1999) in an optimizing model
of exchange rate determination that incorporates a risk premium on foreign debt. An
imperfect global capital market has strong implications for the design of monetary policy
rules in emerging market economies that do not choose to adopt a ‘hard’ peg exchange
rate regime. In particular, it is demonstrated that when external borrowing is subject
to credit risk, the usual requirement that the monetary authorities should fight inflation
aggressively by raising the nominal interest rate more than proportionally with respect to
increases in inflation is not necessary to ensure equilibrium stability and uniqueness. On
the other hand, our analytical findings show that the dynamics of exchange rates, when
the central bank implements interest rate policies, are critically affected by whether mon-
etary policy overreacts or underreacts to inflation. In this respect, the present paper adds
interesting insights to the classical theoretical debate on exchange rate determination.
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Appendix A
Consumption and labor supply can be expressed as function of µ and Λ as follows. Totally
differentiate (7) and (8), given (13), and write the results in matrix notation:

 Ucc Ucℓ
Uℓc Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ



 dc
dℓ

 =

 1 0
−Λφ′ −φ′µ



 dµ
dΛ

 . (A1)
Let Ψ ≡ Ucc (Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ)− U2cℓ > 0. We obtain the following results:
cµ =
dc
dµ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 Ucℓ
−Λφ′ Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
=
Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ+ UcℓΛφ
′
Ψ
< 0, (A2)
cΛ =
dc
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 Ucℓ
−φ′µ Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
=
Ucℓφ
′µ
Ψ
< 0, (A3)
ℓµ =
dℓ
dµ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ucc 1
Uℓc −Λφ
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
= −
UccΛφ
′ + Uℓc
Ψ
> 0, (A4)
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ℓΛ =
dℓ
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ucc 0
Uℓc −φ
′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
= −
Uccφ
′µ
Ψ
> 0. (A5)
Consider now the derivation of the exchange rate determination function (25). By
combining equations (2)-(3) with the Taylor rule (15), we obtain:
i∗ + σ(f) + e = i+ ρ(π∗ + e). (A6)
Totally differentiating the above expression gives:
de (ρ′ − 1) = di∗ + σ′df − di+ ρ′dπ∗. (A7)
Letting de
di∗
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫi∗ = 1,
de
df
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫf = σ
′, de
di
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫi = −1 and
de
dpi∗
(ρ′ − 1) =
ǫπ∗ = −ρ
′, equation (25) immediately follows.
Finally, the equation describing the time path of real money balances can be obtained
by combining (9) with the Taylor rule (15):
V ′(m) = µ (i+ ρ(π∗ + e)) . (A8)
Totally differentiating yields:
V ′′dm = Rdµ+ µ (di+ ρ′dπ∗ + ρ′de) , (A9)
which, given (A7), can be re-written as:
dm =
R
V ′′
dµ+
1
ρ′ − 1
ρ′σ′df − di− ρ′dπ∗ + ρ′di∗
V ′′
µ. (A10)
Letting dm
dµ
= mµ =
R
V ′′
, dm
di∗
(ρ′ − 1) = ηi∗ =
ρ′µ
V ′′
, dm
df
(ρ′ − 1) = ηf =
ρ′σ′µ
V ′′
, dm
di
(ρ′ − 1) =
ηi = −
µ
V ′′
and dm
dpi∗
(ρ′ − 1) = ηπ∗ = −
ρ′µ
V ′′
, equation (24) immediately follows.
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Appendix B
Totally differentiate (26) and (27) and express the results in matrix notation:

 0 σ
′
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ) β



 dµ
df

 =

 1 0 0 1 −1
−f κ −1 0 0




dβ
dΛ
dg
dπ∗
di∗


,
where κ ≡ φ(ℓ(µ,Λ)) + Λφ′ℓΛ(µ,Λ)− cΛ(µ,Λ) > 0.
Letting ∆ ≡ −σ′ (cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)) > 0 we obtain the following set of deriva-
tives:
dµ
dβ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
−f
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
β + σ′f
∆
> 0, (B1)
dµ
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
κ
σ′
−β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
κσ′
∆
< 0, (B2)
dµ
dg
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
−1
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
σ′
∆
> 0, (B3)
dµ
dπ∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
0
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
β
∆
> 0, (B4)
dµ
di∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1
0
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
β
∆
< 0, (B5)
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df
dβ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
[cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)]
1
−f
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
=
1
σ′
> 0, (B6)
df
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
0
κ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= 0, (B7)
df
dg
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
0
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= 0, (B8)
df
dπ∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
=
1
σ′
> 0, (B9)
df
di∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
−1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
= −
1
σ′
< 0. (B10)
Given the above results and using (21)-(25), one obtains the long-run effects on consump-
tion, labor inputs, income, real money balances and exchange rates. This shows results
reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Appendix C
Focusing on the stable path, the solutions for µ, f , c, ℓ, y, m and e are of the following
form:
µ = µ−
σ′µ
λ
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (C1)
f = f +
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (C2)
c = c+ cµ(µ− µ), (C3)
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ℓ = ℓ+ ℓµ(µ− µ), (C4)
y = y + φ′ℓµ(µ− µ), (C5)
m = m+mµ(µ− µ) +
1
ρ′ − 1
ηf
(
f − f
)
, (C6)
e = e+
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫf
(
f − f
)
, (C7)
where λ < 0 is the stable eigenvalue and f0 is the initial condition on foreign debt.
Appendix D
At time t = 0, differentiating (C1)-(C7) with respect to some arbitrary variable, say x,
yields:
dµ (0)+
dx
=
dµ
dx
+
σ′µ
λ
df
dx
, (D1)
df (0)+
dx
= 0, (D2)
dc (0)+
dx
=
dc
dx
+ cµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D3)
dℓ (0)+
dx
=
dℓ
dx
+ ℓµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D4)
dy (0)+
dx
=
dy
dx
+ φ′ℓµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D5)
dm (0)+
dx
=
dm
dx
+mµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
−
1
ρ′ − 1
ηf
df
dx
, (D6)
de (0)+
dx
=
de
dx
−
σ′
ρ′ − 1
df
dx
. (D7)
From the above relationships for x = i, β,Λ, g, i, π∗, using the results reported in Tables
1 and 2, one can easily obtain the impact effects of Tables 3 and 4.
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Table 1: Steady-State Effects of Changes in Domestic Variables
i β Λ g
µ 0 β+σ
′f
∆
> 0 −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
< 0 σ
′
∆
> 0
f 0 1
σ′
> 0 0 0
c 0 cµ
β+σ′f
∆
< 0 cΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′cµ
∆
> 0 σ
′cµ
∆
< 0
ℓ 0 ℓµ
β+σ′f
∆
> 0 ℓΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′ℓµ
∆
⋚ 0 σ′ℓµ
∆
> 0
y 0 φ′ℓµ
β+σ′f
∆
> 0 φ′ℓΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′φ′ℓµ
∆
⋚ 0 σ′φ
′ℓµ
∆
> 0
m − µ
V ′′
1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 R
V ′′
β+σ′f
∆
+ µ
V ′′(ρ′−1)
ρ′ ≶ 0 − [φ(ℓ)+Λφ
′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
R
V ′′
> 0 σ
′
∆
R
V ′′
< 0
e − 1
ρ′−1
≶ 0 1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 0 0
Table 2: Steady-State Effects of Changes in Foreign Variables
π∗ i∗
µ β
∆
> 0 − β
∆
< 0
f 1
σ′
> 0 − 1
σ′
< 0
c −cµ
β
∆
< 0 cµ
β
∆
> 0
ℓ −ℓµ
β
∆
> 0 ℓµ
β
∆
< 0
y −φ′ℓµ
β
∆
> 0 φ′ℓµ
β
∆
< 0
m R
V ′′
β
∆
< 0 − R
V ′′
β
∆
> 0
e −1 0
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Table 3: Impact Effects of Changes in Domestic Variables
i β Λ g
µ (0)+ 0 dµ
dβ
− µ
λ1
> 0 dµ
dΛ
< 0 dµ
dg
> 0
c (0)+ 0 dc
dβ
− cµ
µ
λ1
< 0 dc
dΛ
T 0 dc
dg
< 0
ℓ (0)+ 0 dℓ
dβ
− µ
λ1
ℓµ > 0
dℓ
dΛ
S 0 dℓ
dg
> 0
y (0)+ 0 dy
dβ
− µ
λ1
φ′ℓµ > 0
dy
dΛ
S 0 dy
dg
> 0
m (0)+ − µ
V ′′
1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 R
V ′′
β+σ′f
∆
− R
V ′′
µ
λ1
< 0 −
[φ(ℓ)+φ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
R
V ′′
> 0 σ
′
∆
R
V ′′
< 0
e (0)+ − 1
ρ′−1
≶ 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Impact Effects of Changes in Foreign Variables
π∗ i∗
µ (0)+ dµ
dπ∗
− µ
λ1
> 0 dµ
di∗
+ µ
λ1
< 0
c (0)+ dc
dπ∗
− cµ
µ
λ1
< 0 dc
di∗
+ cµ
µ
λ1
> 0
ℓ (0)+ dℓ
dπ∗
− ℓµ
µ
λ1
> 0 dℓ
di∗
+ ℓµ
µ
λ1
< 0
y (0)+ dy
dπ∗
− φ′ℓµ
µ
λ1
> 0 dy
di∗
+ φ′ℓµ
µ
λ1
< 0
m (0)+ 1
V ′′
(
βR
∆
− Rµ
λ1
− ρ
′µ
ρ′−1
)
≷ 0 1
V ′′
(
−βR
∆
+ Rµ
λ1
+ ρ
′µ
ρ′−1
)
≶ 0
e (0)+ − 1
ρ′−1
ρ′ ≶ 0 1
ρ′−1
≷ 0
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Dynamics under Active Monetary Policy, ρ′ > 1
Figure 1a: Response to an Increase in i Figure 1b: Response an Increase in β
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Figure 2: Exchange Rate Dynamics under Passive Monetary Policy, ρ′ < 1
Figure 2a: Response to an Increase in i Figure 2b: Response an Increase in β
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Figure 2c: Response to an Increase in pi∗ Figure 2d: Response to an Increase in i∗
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